PREQUALIFICATION COMMITTEE
MINUTES – SEPTEMBER 2, 2010
9:00 A.M. EDT

The following Committee members attended the meeting:

Tiffany Mulligan	Director of Economic Opportunity and Prequalification; Chair and Non-Voting Member
Karen Macdonald	Prequalification Engineer; Committee Secretary and Non-Voting Member
Tony Hedge	Director of Accounting; Voting Member
Mark Miller	Director of Construction Management; Voting Member (recused himself from voting on second and third agenda items)
Joe Novak	Crawfordsville District Construction Director; Voting Member
Jim Stark	Seymour District Deputy Commissioner; Voting Member
Troy Woodruff	Deputy Commissioner of Operations; Voting Member
John Wright	Director of Highway Design and Technical Support; Voting Member

Also in attendance:

Mike Rowe	Prequalification Auditor, INDOT
Frederic Bartlett	Prequalification Research Analyst, INDOT
John Leming	Prequalification Research Analyst, INDOT
Richard J. Ayers	President, Superior Construction Company, Inc.
Ted Cuson	Vice President, Superior Construction Company, Inc.
Richard O'Connor	President, RQAW Corporation
Erich Hart	Project Engineer, RQAW Corporation
Nicolas C. Nizamoff	Stuart & Branigin for RQAW Corporation
Paul Berebitsky	Indiana Construction Association (ICA)
Greg Rominger	American Council of Engineering Companies (ACEC)
Leo Spaans	Janssen and Spaans Engineering, Inc.
Marvin Burns	Janssen and Spaans Engineering, Inc.

Joan Widdifield	Contract Administration, INDOT
George Dremonas	Director of Legal Services, INDOT
Anne Rearick	Director of Bridge Design, INDOT
Dave Holtz	Deputy Commissioner of Design, Project Management, and Technical Support, INDOT
Gabe Paul	Attorney, Legal Division, INDOT
Mahmoud Hailat	Staff Engineer, Bridge Design, INDOT
Will Wingfield	Public Information Officer, Office of Communications, INDOT
Chelsea Kirk	Post Tribune
Jack Watson	Indiana Attorney General's Office
Latosha Higgins	Title VI and ADA Program Manager, INDOT
Jennifer Jansen	Attorney, Legal Division, INDOT

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The Committee reviewed the following agenda items:

1. Adoption of August 5, 2010 meeting minutes

2. Superior Construction Co., Inc. - Cracking and closure of Martin Luther King Jr. bridge over I-80

3. RQAW Corporation - Cracking and closure of Martin Luther King Jr. bridge over I-80

PREQUALIFICATION COMMITTEE MEETING
OPEN SESSION
SEPTEMBER 2, 2010

Ms. Mulligan, Committee Chair, called the meeting to order at 9:00 a.m. EDT. She facilitated introductions of all individuals present. All Committee members were present, with the exception of Greg Kicinski. Although Mark Miller attended the meeting, he recused himself from voting.

1. Adoption of August 5, 2010 Meeting Minutes

Ms. Mulligan called for consideration of the meeting minutes from the August 5, 2010 meeting.

Mr. Stark moved to adopt the meeting minutes from the August 5, 2010 meeting. Mr. Hedge seconded the motion. All members voted in favor. Ms. Mulligan stated the minutes would be posted on the website.

2. Superior Construction Co., Inc. and RQAW Corporation- Cracking and closure of Martin Luther King Jr. bridge over I-80

Ms. Mulligan explained the Committee meeting procedures: a representative from INDOT presents the issue first, the contractor is allowed to respond, then the Committee members ask questions. She introduced George Dremonas, Director of Legal Services at INDOT.

Mr. Dremonas introduced the issue. He stated that the INDOT Bridge Design office submitted the issue for Prequalification Committee consideration. There is a problem with the Martin Luther King Jr. bridge over I-80. Anne Rearick will present a PowerPoint demonstration showing the defects in the bridge. INDOT will show that the responsibility falls on the contractor and designer per Standard Specification 107.22. INDOT will present the problems with the bridge and findings. The bridge was built five years ago. It should have a 75 year life if designed and built correctly. The investigation and analysis by INDOT and Janssen and Spaans Engineering, Inc. (JSE) determined that the problems are related to shear capacity in the beams. INDOT will show that there is no credible evidence to indicate that overweight trucks were the cause of the cracks.

Ms. Rearick, Director of Bridge Design at INDOT, stated that she will discuss the findings and finish with conclusions and recommendations. She presented a PowerPoint presentation. She stated that there are multiple significant cracks in the bridge at the piers. The vertical cracks are mainly in the short span. There are longitudinal and transverse cracking in the deck. The cracking extends into the sidewalks and railing. She stated that for a structure this age, we should not see cracking like this. The bridge has two spans with span lengths of 148’-6” and 154’-0”. This was a design-build project and when it went out to bid, the preliminary design consultant suggested that 7’-3” bulb-tee beams with seven inch web be used. Instead, the bridge was built with 7’-0” bulb-tee beams with six inch web. She stated that temporary supports were taken out too soon.

INDOT let the design-build contract on December 17, 2003, and issued a Notice to Proceed to Superior Construction Company, Inc. (Superior) on January 9, 2004. The bridge was opened to traffic on August 23, 2004, and INDOT first noticed shear cracks in the beams during an inspection on March 14, 2009. INDOT contacted JSE to evaluate the bridge on April 26, 2010. JSE recommended the bridge be closed to traffic on May 18, 2010, and INDOT closed the bridge to traffic on May 19, 2010.

Ms. Rearick stated that JSE evaluated the bridge as it stands today and did not do an evaluation of RQAW’s design. JSE’s report indicated that 1) there is insufficient shear capacity in the beams by approximately thirty percent, 2) the moment capacity in the deck over pier two is insufficient, 3) the stresses in the beams exceed the American Association of State Highway

Transportation Officials (AASHTO) standards, and 4) the deck contains different load distributions than as assumed in design.

Mr. Stark asked for an explanation of shear capacity.

Ms. Rearick responded that shear capacity is provided by the stirrup reinforcing in the beams. When talking about moment forces, we are talking about a rotational force.

Ms. Rearick stated that INDOT is concerned with all the cracks in the deck. INDOT has evaluated the design and determined that the fillet loads, pedestrian live load, and the metal deck form loads were not accounted for in the design; the stresses in the deck and beams exceeded AASHTO standards; the temporary supports were not adequately accounted for in the design; and there were shear design inconsistencies. She stated the load distribution is different than as designed.

Ms. Rearick stated that the fillet loads computed to 0.111 kip per foot for the short span and 0.206 kip per foot for the long span. She stated the Executive Summary submitted to the Committee by David Holtz, Deputy Director of Design, Project Management, and Technical Support, incorrectly stated the loads in pounds per foot instead of kips per foot. (A kip is 1000 pounds.) The bridge has a vertical curve and the deck and beams do not curve at the same rate. The load calculations have to account for the variable depth of the fillet.

Ms. Rearick stated that AASHTO requires additional pedestrian live load at the sidewalks and was not included in the design. The RQAW designer elected to omit the weight of the stay-in-place metal deck forms because Styrofoam fill was used.

Ms. Rearick stated the bridge shows inadequate support. INDOT questions the validity of use of the temporary supports. They were not adequately documented in the design computations. With a composite section, the beams and deck act together after the deck is cured. Application of the deck dead load did not follow standard practice. Typical practice is to apply the deck load on the non-composite section, not the composite section.

Ms. Rearick explained that shear reinforcement is the stirrup bars in the beams. They are spaced closer together near the ends of the beam and spread further apart away from the ends. She stated the shear bar spacing did not match the designer's PCBM design software output. She stated the designer checked the bridge using a load rating software VIRTIS, which determines how the bridge will fail. It showed moment failure first before shear failure. This is an acceptable method for analysis, but the problem with this program is that once it determines the first method of failure, it stops.

Ms. Rearick stated the load capacity was checked and determined the capacity is below what it should be to support the bridge. RQAW completed the Load Rating dated May 15, 2009.

Ms. Rearick stated that INDOT has changed the design truck load since this bridge was designed.

Ms. Rearick stated that RQAW suggests the cracking is possibly due to Delayed Ettringite Formation (DEF), due to the beams being cured at a higher temperature. It is not conclusive that DEF is an issue. She stated that Superior hired the precast, prestressed beam fabricator. It is Superior's responsibility.

Ms. Rearick recommended that both Superior and RQAW be banned for one year from INDOT projects and be required to provide Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC) plans and demonstrate through QC checks that future work is acceptable to INDOT.

Ms. Mulligan asked if there were any questions to clarify INDOT's presentation.

Mr. Stark asked what the difference is between a design-build and a standard build project.

Ms. Rearick replied that a design-build project is designed to thirty percent plans and recommendations are made prior to letting the contract. The contractor and designer team to complete the design and build the structure. Superior and RQAW were the design-build team on this project.

Mr. Stark stated that as the design-build team, Superior and RQAW should have accountability as a team.

Ms. Rearick stated the team works together and submits plans to INDOT for consideration. Shop drawings are the responsibility of the designer.

Mr. Woodruff asked about the significance of the six inch beam web instead of the seven inch web.

Ms. Rearick stated that the thinner web would have less area to resist shear stresses.

Ms. Mulligan suggested Superior and RQAW have an opportunity to respond at this time.

Mr. Ted Cuson, Superior Vice President, stated the design-build question was good. The contract information book specified to use a design firm that was acceptable to INDOT. Superior submitted the team to INDOT for approval prior to bidding. Superior chose RQAW because of their experience and reputation. INDOT required the team to submit plans for design review. There were times when the submittal was not approved and the team had to resubmit. Even though the team was responsible, INDOT had oversight; it was like a hand and glove with INDOT. On the first day of casting the beams, the concrete mix design was changed. Superior's fabricator cast the beams, but INDOT provided inspection. At the time the bridge was built, INDOT indicated that the work was well done. Mr. Cuson stated that he agrees that cracking on the bridge is terrible, and Superior is concerned about it.

Mr. Cuson stated that at the first meeting with INDOT to address the cracking problem, INDOT thought the problem was a design error. Superior didn't immediately say it was not the design and had RQAW review the design to see what happened. We still have to determine what

happened. If the design was good and the construction was good, then we need to determine the source of the real problem. Many trucks left the Borman due to the flooding, and there is a lot of unauthorized hauling. This road is a roller coaster that gets heavy traffic.

Mr. Dick O'Connor, RQAW President, provided packages of their response to JSE's report and the memo from Dave Holtz. He stated he would respond to the issues outlined in Mr. Holtz's memo first. He stated that RQAW is in total agreement that the bridge is experiencing distress. RQAW thinks it is isolated to the exterior beams. INDOT had provided reports to RQAW a few weeks ago. The reports indicated there is inadequate shear capacity and other omissions. He stated that RQAW agrees with the analysis in terms of the shear and moment calculations. He stated RQAW does not agree that the shear capacity is less than the applied loads. RQAW does not agree that they did not use the correct AASHTO section. Chapter 9 formulas were used because the beam was precast.

Mr. O'Connor stated that RQAW believes the cracking is not due to a design error. He stated it is not a design problem or a construction problem. RQAW believes it is a material problem.

Mr. O'Connor stated that the memo from Mr. Holtz indicated that United Consulting Engineers' (UCE) construction plans specify a 7'-3" beam depth. The 7'-3" depth was the structure depth including the slab depth. The profile grade of both roads was given. UCE gave no beam spacing. As the designer, RQAW had to maintain the depth for vertical clearance at the overpass. 154 feet is a healthy span for the given structure depth. RQAW worked with the contractor and fabricator to find the lightest beam possible.

Mr. O'Connor stated the JSE report mentioned ducts in the beam. The beams were prestressed, not post tensioned.

Mr. O'Connor stated that RQAW chose the six inch web thickness to lighten the beam. INDOT was well aware of the beam's web width and that lightweight concrete was proposed. He stated the design was not done in a vacuum. INDOT approved it.

Mr. O'Connor stated the February 2005 bridge inspection report indicated there was nothing unusual with the deck cracking. The March 2007 inspection report indicated there was nothing remarkable. The March 2009 bridge inspection report indicated there were shear cracks.

Mr. O'Connor addressed items stated in an email from Mr. Marvin Burns of JSE. The email mentioned the presence of ducts in the web. There are no ducts in the web. The email referenced too much compression in the bottom fiber of the beam. Mr. O'Connor stated that with a beam, part is in tension and part in compression. It does not change throughout the length, yet cracks are throughout the beam.

Mr. O'Connor stated that you can see by the pictures the cracks are not isolated. They run the entire length of the beam. Very little has been said about the interior beams. If the cracks were due to design, then the interior beams should show more cracking than the exterior

beams because there is more load on the interior beams. The cracking is not isolated at a bearing point, instead the cracks are throughout.

Mr. O'Connor stated that Superior and RQAW took pictures of the interior beams yesterday and did not see any cracking.

Mr. Cuson asked about timeliness of communications.

Ms. Rearick replied that the problem was that RQAW was unable to provide all design documentation.

Mr. O'Connor replied that they gave INDOT all they have and are trying to recreate what is missing.

Mr. O'Connor addressed Section III in the memo from Mr. Holtz, which listed JSE's findings. He stated JSE found there was insufficient shear capacity in the beams. Mr. O'Connor stated that RQAW responded in writing to JSE's findings on August 10, 2010. He stated that AASHTO Chapter 9 should be used and not Chapter 8. The reasons are conventional reinforcing was used, and they proposed lightweight concrete with lightweight sand.

Mr. O'Connor stated Exhibit 16 indicates that principle stresses exceed allowable stresses for a segmental bridge. The structure was not a segmental bridge.

Mr. O'Connor stated there are several explanations for deck cracking that are not design related issues. One possibility is missing reinforcement, which is not a design issue. Another is support settlement; however, Superior investigated this and found no settlement.

Mr. O'Connor referred to Exhibit 17 and addressed the conclusion given by JSE that the moment capacity as highly questionable. He stated this is speculation. The capacity exceeds the loads supplied.

Mr. O'Connor addressed the JSE finding that stresses in the beams exceed the AASHTO Standard. He addressed the statement that RQAW has not provided an analysis. He stated the original beam analysis is shown in Exhibit 19 in the first packet. RQAW's modeling and analysis closely follows the output from JSE's BRUCO analysis. The total factored shears are basically the same. The percentages can be compared, and the analysis has little difference than the model that INDOT had confidence in for all beams.

Mr. Stark asked if there is an acceptable variance.

Ms. Rearick replied that they would have to look at the numbers.

Mr. O'Connor pointed out that in Span 1, H/2 right, the RQAW total factored shear was 367.10, while the BRUCO value was 363.38. At 0.9L, RQAW's value was 331.3, while the BRUCO value was 332.24. He stated the values are very close, and the total factor shear shows there is more than required.

Mr. Nicolas Nizamoff, legal representative for RQAW, stated there is very little difference in the values. He also stated that RQAW has not had a lot of time to respond or review the allegations. They just received a copy of the memo from Mr. Holtz on Tuesday.

Mr. Erich Hart, Project Engineer for RQAW, stated that RQAW had help from Professor Lee. The software allowed RQAW to do staged loads by superimposing the loads to account for the temporary supports.

Mr. O'Connor addressed JSE's conclusion in Item #4 that the extensive cracking in the deck has modified the load distribution. He stated that cracked concrete would not affect the distributed loads. He stated the INDOT inspections found no problems.

Mr. O'Connor addressed INDOT findings from Section III b). regarding the claim that RQAW could not find design calculations. He stated RQAW provided all information to INDOT and were transparent in everything.

Mr. O'Connor stated that INDOT's design analysis used smaller prestressing strands than RQAW used. The steel area used by RQAW was 0.167 verses 0.150 square inches assumed by INDOT. The steel strength was 270 kips per square inch.

Mr. O'Connor stated that the fifteen pounds per foot for stay-in-place forms can be omitted if the flutes are filled in with Styrofoam. Mr. O'Connor stated that at two pounds per foot at 2'-6", the load is five pounds and is negligible.

Mr. O'Connor stated the above two issues were discussed with INDOT and were acknowledged.

Mr. O'Connor admitted RQAW did not correctly account for the fillet dead loads.

Mr. O'Connor stated that although they have not shown the pedestrian live load was included in the design, RQAW always considers the load and it would be distributed to all beams. He referred to the typical section in Exhibit 18 and stated a wheel load is shown in line with the sidewalk. The wheel loads do not go to the exterior beam. He stated RQAW cannot prove they considered the pedestrian live load, but he is sure they considered it. He stated it is a loading condition that should be considered.

Mr. O'Connor addressed Item #3 stating the specification for the stay-in-place forms require that the flutes be filled with Styrofoam, and RQAW followed the specification.

Mr. O'Connor addressed Item #4 stating the temporary supports were used and were necessary for the 154 foot span for the prestressed beams. Bob Lee was used as a consultant.

Mr. Hart stated RQAW could not find the original PCBM design run. They had hand written comments about the temporary supports on the computer printout. He said the output is the same.

Mr. Nizamoff stated the JSE analysis concluded the temporary supports were necessary in the design.

Mr. O'Connor addressed Item #5 regarding the deck load application. RQAW's designer applied the deck load to the composite beams.

Ms. Rearick stated that we have unanswered questions on the composite model and the input conditions.

Mr. O'Connor addressed Item #6 regarding flexural stress in the deck and beams. He stated the February 2005 bridge inspection report indicated excessive cracking but stated it was not different than what was found on other bridges. He stated the deck did not change over those initial years and proves the cracks were not load created. He also stated the longitudinal cracks on the bottom flange of the beams running one end of the bridge to the other also prove they are not load created stress cracks.

Mr. O'Connor addressed Item #7 regarding shear capacity. He stated that based on the Conspan analysis, the shear demand exceeds shear capacity. He stated that RQAW is aware that Conspan is not design software.

Mr. O'Connor referred to Exhibit 19 in the second packet.

Mr. Hart stated that Conspan provides a recommended design, and it will run a full blown analysis. It is a tool to determine the full design. VIRTIS is not design software but is used for analysis. It can be used to do a design check; however, if it gets tripped up, it will stop the analysis. PCBM is design software. BRUCO is analysis software. We currently only have the latest version of VIRTIS and not the 2003 version that was originally used for the design. Mr. Hart believes the designer checked the design using VIRTIS. There were seven hand-written notes on the plans spelling out the assumptions.

Mr. Hart also stated that his wife ran a VIRTIS analysis on the structure, but it stopped short of the temporary support analysis.

Mr. Cuson stated that the after-the-fact analysis was done by RQAW through an on-call bridge inspection of 1500 bridges.

Mr. O'Connor addressed Item #4 regarding reasonability of RQAW and Superior to provide information. He stated he was not aware RQAW did not provide information. If there is something INDOT needs, please let him know and RQAW will provide it. He stated that there is transparency here.

Mr. O'Connor stated that RQAW acknowledges the bridge is under stress. He stated RQAW went through their design and did not see a problem. RQAW wants to find the problem. They have not seen cracking in the bottom of the beams on other bridges. RQAW hired Mr. John Fraczek from Wiss, Janney, Elstner Associates, Inc. (WJE). Mr. Fraczek is a forensic

consultant. He reviewed RQAW's design and analyzed the problem. Without seeing the structure, Mr. Fraczek said it was not a load problem. Mr. Fraczek suggested the cracking was due to Delayed Ettringite Formation (DEF). He has seen this problem in bulb-tee beams on several structures. Mr. O'Connor stated he shared this information with INDOT. Mr. O'Connor passed out a letter from Mr. Fraczek to the Committee members.

Mr. O'Connor addressed Exhibit 20, which includes documentation on DEF and Mr. Fraczek's resume. He stated that DEF was first noticed or identified in 1996. The structure was constructed in 1988. The structure experienced longitudinal cracking in the bottom flange of the beams eight years after it was originally constructed. He stated that in beams of considerable distress, cracking is found in the bottom flange.

Mr. O'Connor read Mr. Fraczek's letter dated September 1, 2010. He pointed out in the background portion of the letter, Mr. Fraczek refers to the JSE report and the statement that the moment capacity is highly questionable. Mr. Fraczek indicated that the most likely reasons for the problems could be Alkali Silica Reactivity (ASR) or DEF; however, Mr. Fraczek indicated the problems were probably not associated with ASR.

Mr. O'Connor stated that high temperature curing and exposure to moisture in-service causes DEF. The beams were steam cured per the fabrication reports. He stated we are seeing the stress on the exterior beams and not the interior beams due to DEF.

Mr. O'Connor stated that the cracking developed sometime after the 2007 inspection, thus between two and a half to four and a half years after construction. Mr. O'Connor stated that cracking would have been present at the 2007 inspection if it were a design load problem.

Mr. O'Connor continued with comments from Mr. Fraczek's letter referring to the apparent shear cracks. If there is deficient shear reinforcement, there would be fewer wide cracks.

Mr. O'Connor stated that Mr. Fraczek's conclusion is that the problem with the structure is a materials related issue and not a design issue.

Mr. O'Connor stated that he understands that INDOT wants to demolish the structure. He stated the structure can be repaired at a much lower cost if the cause is DEF. He suggested testing be done to determine if the cause is DEF.

Mr. O'Connor admitted that RQAW did make mistakes on this project, but their design did not cause the cracks.

Mr. Cuson stated Superior purchased the beams and they were steam cured. The beam fabricator was certified by INDOT. He asked why INDOT allows steam curing. He stated that if DEF caused the problem, then he has a hard time accepting that Superior is responsible. Superior has been a contractor for many years and has been a good contractor for INDOT, with good ratings on projects. A one year suspension would be devastating to Superior. He said it would not be a death sentence, but a lot of people would lose jobs. He stated he feels Superior

should not be penalized. It was absolutely not Superior's fault. Superior has two contracts on which they were the low bidder and the decision to award those contracts is pending this meeting.

Ms. Mulligan asked if there were any questions. She mentioned several options open to the Committee.

Mr. Stark asked who the prime contractor was on this contract.

Mr. Richard Ayers, President of Superior, replied that Superior was the prime contractor.

Mr. Stark asked if it is the prime contractor's responsibility to provide materials.

Mr. Ayers replied yes.

Mr. Nizamoff stated that a one year suspension would be devastating to RQAW.

Mr. Stark stated that RQAW originally agreed to redesign the structure at their cost.

Mr. Stark mentioned he used to own a concrete plant. He stated they did not fabricate precast concrete members but poured a lot of structural concrete. He stated that cracks on the exterior beams and not the interior beams could be caused by other factors. He stated the issue is who is going to fix the bridge.

Mr. Nizamoff stated that RQAW and Superior's livelihoods are at stake.

Mr. Stark stated that INDOT's concern is that this bridge is failing, and we need to fix it and hold people accountable.

Mr. Ayers stated that Superior does not know the actual cause; whether it is design, construction, DEF, or materials. He stated that INDOT should not penalize us at this time. He admitted that Superior is responsible for purchasing the products.

Mr. Stark asked if Superior or RQAW has done any testing of the concrete.

Mr. Ayers stated they cannot get to the interior beams because of traffic on I-80.

Mr. Stark stated that they can test the deck concrete. It should be tested since it is failing.

Mr. Ayers stated they would like to determine the cause.

Mr. Stark stated that this Committee exists for people to be held accountable for their responsibilities and we cannot wait to get this fixed. If it is fixable, we have to work at getting this done. It looks like it is not fixable.

Ms. Rearick concurred with Mr. Stark.

Ms. Mulligan asked about the process for determining if it is a material issue. She asked how long it would take and if the answer would be definitive.

Mr. Nizamoff stated they are still determining the cause.

Ms. Rearick stated she is not confident with the exterior beams and the deck cracking is not typical.

Mr. Cuson stated that we are all saying the same thing that there is a problem.

Mr. O'Connor stated that he does not think the exterior beams have failed or deflected yet. He thinks they can be repaired.

Mr. Stark stated that RQAW will not know the problem until the testing is done.

Ms. Rearick stated that Purdue University is doing an investigation and coring concrete. She stated that it could be a material issue with DEF, but she also thinks it is a design problem.

Mr. O'Connor asked why the interior beams are not cracked like the exterior beams.

Ms. Rearick responded that there is a different load distribution.

Mr. O'Connor replied that the exterior beams carry less load.

Ms. Rearick stated that Mr. Burns's letter addressed the design versus what was built.

Mr. Novak stated that he shares the same concerns that Mr. Stark has. As an owner, we have certain responsibilities. He stated that if the contractor or consultant is not cooperative or responsive on trying to determine the problem, then he would be more comfortable imposing a penalty to their prequalification status. He asked if RQAW has been responsive to INDOT's requests for information.

Ms. Rearick replied that the last correspondence and request for information was on August 8, 2010.

Mr. O'Connor stated that Mr. Hart sent him a response for his review, and it has not been submitted to INDOT yet.

Mr. Hart stated that RQAW is trying to be responsive. They have not determined what model they can work with to address the conditions.

Mr. O'Connor stated that RQAW wants to work with INDOT to the full extent.

Mr. Ayers stated that Superior also wants to work with INDOT.

Mr. Stark asked what loads are allowed on it now.

Ms. Rearick replied that the structure is closed.

Mr. Stark stated that it is Superior's and RQAW's responsibility to fix the structure.

Mr. Woodruff stated he agrees with Mr. Stark's comments. The bridge was inspected in 2005 and now it has been closed since May. He stated that Superior originally suggested that the problems may be due to heavier truck traffic detoured due to flooding. Now Superior and RQAW are suggesting the problem is due to the concrete. He questioned why material testing is just now starting. Testing should have been started before now. He stated that INDOT believes the break down is with Superior and RQAW.

Mr. Nizamoff stated that both Superior and RQAW have worked for INDOT for years and are competent contractors. He requested that the Committee not fault or penalize them from continuing to do competent work for INDOT.

Mr. Stark asked how long it will take to review and investigate. He asked Superior and RQAW if they have a plan of action for repairs and a timeline.

Mr. Nizamoff stated that Superior and RQAW plan to use WJE and the timeline depends on the availability of Mr. Fraczek. Once the analysis is done, Superior and RQAW can implement the repairs relatively quickly.

Mr. Stark stated that when the Committee brings a contractor in, our goal is not to suspend them. We put the contractor on notice to get the problem resolved. This is a problem that exists because the bridge failed in five years and should have lasted 40 years. We want to hear proposed solutions and how quickly the repairs can be done. We have agreed to be fair and that is why we bring people before this Committee. We need to understand the time frame in order to address this and revisit this.

Ms. Mulligan called for a motion.

Mr. Stark moved to not take any action affecting Superior and RQAW's prequalification status at this time but to have them back to provide a status report. He stated that Superior and RQAW need to work together to determine the problem and solution.

Ms. Mulligan stated that the Committee can call Superior and RQAW back automatically or can recommend that Ms. Rearick ask the Committee to bring them back if this issue is not resolved.

Mr. Nizamoff requested to confer with Mr. Dremonas.

Mr. Stark repeated his motion to not take action affecting Superior and RQAW's prequalification status at this time and to have them come before the Committee at next month's meeting to provide a status report.

Mr. Woodruff seconded the motion.

All Committee members voted in favor.

Ms. Mulligan stated that a letter will be sent to both companies outlining the Committee's decision.

Mr. Cuson requested access to the bridge.

Ms. Rearick responded that INDOT will work with Superior to get access. They have to work out the traffic control.

Mr. Hart questioned how RQAW can commit to a plan and timeline when they do not have WJE on board yet.

Mr. Stark stated the Committee wants to see a status report with explanations of where Superior and RQAW are regarding testing and a proposed plan to repair or replace the structure.

Mr. Novak moved to adjourn the meeting, and Mr. Stark seconded. All members voted in favor of adjourning the meeting.

Ms. Mulligan adjourned the meeting at approximately 11:41 a.m.